Publication

Too Soon? P.E.I. Court Denies Stay of Proceedings as Premature

Published:

April 4, 2024

Author(s):

• Raylene Langor
• Olivia Feschuk
• Tom Keeler

Share

Print

In January 2024, the Supreme Court of Prince Edward Island explored the doctrine of prematurity in the context of the legal test for a stay of regulatory proceedings. The Court’s January 11, 2024 dismissal of a motion to stay regulatory proceedings in Bengeri v. College of Physicians and Surgeons (PEI) builds on a large body of decisions confirming courts’ reluctance to interfere with ongoing administrative proceedings and affirms the concept of judicial respect for administrative decision-makers with responsibility to make decisions in accordance with their enabling legislation. Here’s a dive into the case, the doctrine of prematurity and how the Court ultimately applied the test for a stay in Prince Edward Island. 

The Investigation. In June 2021, the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Prince Edward Island received a complaint alleging a physician had made clinical errors contributing to a patient’s death. Under the College’s governing framework, the Investigation Committee was responsible for investigating the complaint. During the investigation, the College tried to negotiate a resolution with the anaesthesiologist but these efforts were unsuccessful. Following its investigation, the Investigation Committee referred the complaint to the Hearing Committee for a hearing and provided its reasons for doing so. The College ultimately scheduled the hearing. The physician applied to the P.E.I. Supreme Court for judicial review of the Investigation Committee’s decision to refer the complaint to a hearing and asked that the Court quash it. The College informed the physician the hearing would proceed as planned despite their judicial review application. The physician applied to the Court for a stay of all proceedings by the College pending the outcome of the judicial review application.

The Decision. The Court refused to grant a stay of proceedings pending the outcome of the judicial review application based on the three-part legal test for a stay – none of which the physician established.

• Serious issue to be tried. The Court found the physician did meet the low threshold for this first part of the stay test – but ultimately opined there were no exceptional circumstances to warrant judicial intervention. The physician’s pending judicial review proceeding was neither vexatious nor frivolous. However, the Court nevertheless expressed concerns about the merits of the physician’s judicial review proceeding and its apparent prematurity. The Court explained that delays and bifurcation often occur when courts prematurely interfere with administrative proceedings and courts shouldn’t intervene absent exceptional circumstances, of which there were none.

• No irreparable harm. The Court also found its refusal of a stay would not result in irreparable harm to the physician, the second part of the stay test. There must be explicit and detailed evidence to prove irreparable harm. The physician argued the College’s process had caused them significant stress, impacting their health and potentially patient care. They also argued that if the matter continued to a public hearing they would suffer irreparable reputational damage even if the decision-maker ultimately determined the allegations unfounded. The Court examined the Legislature’s intent when delegating its authority to the College to regulate the profession via the College’s governing legislation and concluded the College appeared to have followed the required process. The Court particularly considered the fact the legislation specifically contemplates a public hearing on the merits of the allegations in which the physician would have the opportunity to present a defence. The Court noted it was difficult to see how a hearing on the merits would impact a physician’s reputation particularly given the physician’s judicial review application would also be public. Finally, it commented that if the physician were dissatisfied with the hearing process or the resulting decision, the legislation gives them the right to apply for judicial review of that decision and to seek a further appeal of that judicial review decision to the Court.

• The balance of convenience does not favor a stay. The Court decided the balance of convenience, the third part of the stay test, as between the anesthesiologist and the public interest did not favor the physician. The stay was to stop the continuation of a process authorized by statute, not a final decision or order on the substance of the allegations. They were effectively asking the Court to fragment proceedings pending the hearing of a judicial review in the absence of a final decision and a full record from the hearing. The Court concluded the College’s public interest mandate to complete the disciplinary process as authorized by the legislation outweighed the physician’s interests in obtaining the stay. The Court distinguished this case from the P.E.I. Court of Appeal’s 2014 decision in Swart v. College of Physicians and Surgeons (P.E.I.). There, the Court granted a stay in circumstances where a physician faced a restriction on their ability to practice following the completion of a hearing and irreparable harm was conceded. Here, the physician continued to practice without suspension or restriction.

Please contact your McInnes Cooper lawyer or any member of our Regulation of Professions Team @ McInnes Cooper to discuss when a stay of regulatory proceedings is – or isn’t – appropriate .

Share

Print